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ABSTRACT: This article recounts Foucault’s critical reevaluation of Thomas Hobbes in his 
1975-76 lecture course, published as Society Must Be Defended (2003).  In probing Hobbes’ pivo-
tal role in the foundation of the modern nation-state, Foucault delineates the ‛philosophico-
juridical‛ discourse of Leviathan from the ‛historico-political‛ discourses of the English insur-
rectionists whose uncompromising demands were ultimately paved over by the more conven-
tional seventeenth century debate between royalists and parliamentarians.  In his most sus-
tained engagement with political philosophy proper, Foucault effectively severs the two co-
constitutive terms, enumerating the damning consequences of thinking politics apart from 
history and philosophy apart from the laws and codes that had been ‚born in the mud and 
blood of battles.‛ Displacing himself in the archive, Foucault doubles the Levellers and Dig-
gers’ efforts to restage the violent conquests that undergird our seemingly calm governmental 
regimes.  This doubling, I argue, evinces the profound influence of Deleuze’s innovative onto-
logy of time on Foucault’s genealogical method.  Foucault’s research strategy takes a funda-
mental turn towards specific techniques of cultural memory in the wake of his colleague’s 
radical reconceptualization of virtuality, difference, and repetition.  To this end, I take up Fou-
cault’s review essay ‛Theatrum Philosophicum‛ and his comments on method in ‛Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History‛ in order to draw an analogy between what he does in 1976 and what the 
Levellers and Diggers were doing in 1651.  In the final analysis, genealogy means war, and, in 
this war, it is the very being of the virtual itself that is at stake. 
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1. Genealogy 
Society Must Be Defended: ‚Society must be defended!‛—thusly goes the refrain of Foucault’s 
lecture course in 1976, wherein he famously inverts Clausewitz’s line and argues that modern 
political societies extend rather than replace the functional dynamics of war.  His strategy for 
the course is, first, to determine the efficacy of war as an analyzer of power relations, and 
second, to unearth those lost discourses to which Clausewitz had helped to paper over when 
he claimed war to be ‚politics by other means.‛ In the January 7 lecture (the first of the 
course), the name Clausewitz is synecdoche for modern European contract theory, the hege-
mony of the nation-state, and what Foucault names a ‚philosophico-juridical‛ discourse of 
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sovereignty, which all work in tandem for society’s defence, as it were, by subjugating those 
attempting to articulate war as generative of and effectively, artfully contiguous with civil 
peace.  Against such philosophico-juridical discourses, which Foucault sees emerging with the 
work of Thomas Hobbes in the mid-seventeenth century, are those who seek instead a ‚his-
torico-political‛ analysis of social life.  Though it remains central to the course in 1976, this 
opposition between the philosophico-juridical and the historico-political is not a particularly 
pervasive theme in Foucault’s overall body of work.  I would like here to pinpoint why that 
might be, and then to suggest certain points of resonance with his earlier and later projects, 
which would at first appear to be entirely divergent from the lines of thought introduced in 
these lectures.  Society Must Be Defended, for its part, keeps to this thematic opposition, and in 
turn gives us a rare glimpse of Foucault directly engaged with the modern political philoso-
phical tradition, which he puts into play as historically contingent, on the one hand, and as the 
‚strategic opposite number‛ to his own genealogical investigation of power, on the other.   
But how are we to take these dichotomous conjunctive terms by which Foucault 
organizes his sense of what was happening circa 1651?  In what sense can we understand the 
relationship between the philosophico-juridical and the historico-political as one of ‚strategic 
opposition‛?  Foucault insists throughout the course that, counter to the state historians like 
Hobbes and Clausewitz, insurrectionist groups like the Levellers and Diggers offer a fun-
damentally different ‚grid of intelligibility‛ for processing social life; not only do they aim to 
arrive at contrary destinations, but they are not even using the same map.  On the philoso-
phico-juridical grid, things (phenomena, events, subjects, interactions) are plotted along axes 
of eternality and order.  Conversely, things on the historico-political grid are plotted according 
to temporality and force.1  It should be clear that Foucault by no means includes all juridical 
thought or all philosophy within the category of philosophico-juridical discourse; nor does 
what we might commonly think of as history or political thought necessarily have anything to 
do with the historico-political ‚grid‛ he outlines.  Rather, he has something much more speci-
fic in mind in his deployment of these terms.  Their power inheres in the conjunction—in the 
hyphen.  For example, genealogy, as ‚effective history‛2 attains its methodological efficacy 
precisely in its politicization.  Hobbes, for his part (as we will see below), dissolves the hyphen 
and so frees history from politics and vice versa; consequently, he can be hailed as the father of 
modern political thought, and the state historian par excellence, while systematically elimina-
ting the viability of a historico-political grid of intelligibility.   
It bears noting that, by Foucault’s reasoning, we are still (or at least were, at the time of 
his lectures) playing out the hobbesian legacy, still living in the wake of his philosophico-
juridical function, the violent historical episodes of which Foucault finds ripe for restaging in 
1976.  In retrospect, this would be a pivotal year in Foucault’s career, marking the onset of an 
eight year publishing ‚silence.‛3  Deleuze suggests that, having completed research for the 
first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault was perhaps feeling trapped by his own 
                                                 
1 A reductive, albeit no less applicable, transposition of this schema can be seen in the opposition between 
constitutional originalists and pragmatists in American legal scholarship. 
2 Michel Foucault, ‚Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,‛ in Donald Bouchard (ed.), Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 154.   
3 Deleuze takes this ‚silence‛ up at length in the interviews on Foucault collected in Negotiations.   
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brilliant formulation of power, that he needed to conceptualize an escape, and that it took him 
these eight years to successfully arrive at his late notion of subjectivation and the ethico-
aesthetic program of self-care.4  Far from anomalous, Foucault’s interest in war in the 1976 
lectures would segue into his prolonged—and far more influential (at least among Anglo-
phonic Foucauldians)—engagement with governmentality in the lecture courses that would 
follow.  This latter concept would itself metamorphose significantly as the ‚third dimension‛5 
of Foucault’s thought slowly crystallized in the subsequent volumes of The History of Sexuality, 
tacking from concerns over population management in nineteenth century France to his 
radical rethinking of self-creation beginning with the ancient Greeks and early Christians.  I 
am not interested here in recounting what so much good scholarship has already achieved 
with regard to Foucault’s thought on governmentality.6  Rather, I want to tease out certain 
difficulties presented by Foucault’s brief intrigue with social war in 1976, and to situate that 
year’s lectures at the interstice between his ‚diagrammatic‛ historical investigations of power 
formations and his late exposition of styles of living capable of folding relations of force back 
in on themselves.   
Driven, as Deleuze says, by ‚creative necessity‛ above all else,7 Foucault, in 1976, be-
gins his search for a concept able to escape the ‚microphysics‛ of power which Discipline and 
Punish and volume one of The History of Sexuality had so precisely laid out.  But how are we to 
account for the rubric of social war forwarded in Society Must Be Defended and sustained, as I 
believe it is, through the lectures on governmentality and population control in the subsequent 
three years?8  The recuperation of the grievances of the Levellers and Diggers, the conjuring of 
their insurrectionist spirit, is Foucault’s first move out of the gates following the series of 
explosive archaeological breakthroughs by which he had unearthed the power-knowledge 
arrangements foundational to the institutions and disciplines of the modern era.  The theori-
zation of social war thus marks Foucault’s first attempt to draw a line of escape from his own 
thought—not a refutation by any means, rather an effort to search for new weapons, weapons 
which could be deployed in the present.9   
Nonetheless, in many respects, the project of 1976 would seem to perpetuate many of 
the methodological and thematic concerns that had been in play since 1969’s Archeology of 
Knowledge, most significantly the diagramming of those countervailing forces constitutive of 
disciplinary societies.  So, in the context of Foucault’s famous ‚silence,‛ should we take the ge-
nealogical resurrection of these specific discourses on war as an essential grounding point for 
Foucault’s later work?  Or is it merely a false start, cut short or détourned in the slow move 
towards subjectivity and self-care?  And what is it about Hobbes and the liberal tradition that 
emerged in his wake that attracts Foucault’s attention at this critical point in his career?  These 
                                                 
4 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, translated by Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia UP, 1995), 83. 
5 Ibid., 83. 
6 See, for example, the widely influential work of Nikolas Rose, Mitchell Dean, and the Burchell et al. edition 
The Foucault Effect. 
7 Deleuze, Negotiations, 92. 
8 I am referring of course to the lecture courses of 1977-78 and 1978-79, published as Security, Territory, Popu-
lation (2007) and The Birth of Biopolitics (2008), respectively. 
9 Deleuze, Negotiations, 86. 
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questions will guide the inquiry that follows.  As a preliminary hypothesis, I will suggest a ne-
cessary connection between Foucault’s idea of the masked persistence of war underpinning 
power relations in liberal societies and his genealogical method in general, which would 
immediately proceed to retrace the discursive bearings of the administrative state and neo-
liberal economic rationality.10  In short, genealogy is war, but, as I make evident below, it will 
take Deleuze’s concept of the virtual and its relation to lived, cosmic time to really grasp what 
is at stake when we make such a claim.  For now, it should be clear that, even if the concept of 
social war is not the right solution for Foucault in this phase of evolutionary quiescence, then 
it must at least be recognized as an integral element of the new problem he sought to 
formulate with respect to the individuals enmeshed in and subjectivated by apparatuses of 
power.   
In mid-seventeenth century England, protests over the enclosure of the commons, 
alongside various other challenges to the lopsided power dynamics anchoring the fragile civil 
peace, coalesced around the general subscription to war as the basic analytical model for social 
relations.  Like the ‚lives of infamous men‛ that Foucault would take up the following year,11 
the voices initiating these protests and challenges would quickly get subsumed in the archival 
detritus of a battle that only they could bear witness to as having actually taken place.  It is the 
victor, Hobbes, who, as architect and archetype of the liberal tradition, serves as a foil for the 
critical project Foucault embarks on in Society Must Be Defended.  Extreme anthropological pes-
simism notwithstanding, Hobbes12 functionally eliminates the historical reality of war, con-
ceals the bloody origins of sovereign power, and thus saves the state from the civil strife 
warranted by vast material inequality in the wake of conquest.13 Securing the grounds for a 
philosophico-juridical discursive takeover, ‚Hobbes’ operation< consisted in exploiting every 
possibility< to silence the discourse of political historicism< *and+ the knowledge that was 
actually active in the political struggles of the seventeenth century.‛14  This is to say that there 
had existed, in the open, a perspectival ‚knowledge‛—a singular claim to truth—capable of 
severing thought from the normalized power-knowledge arrangement that would usher in the 
modern era.   
                                                 
10 See note 4, above.   
11 See Foucault, ‚Lives of Infamous Men,‛ The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, volume three, ed. James 
Faubion (New York: The New Press, 2000), 157-175. 
12 We should note that, following Foucault, we use ‚Hobbes‛ to designate not an individual person, an au-
thorial agent, but an author-function—an index of discursive forces or a convenient placeholder for an open 
set of power effects.  See Foucault’s elaboration on the author-function in ‚What is an Author?,‛ where he 
generously offers us the following summary: ‚The ‘author-function’ is tied to the legal and institutional 
systems that circumscribe, determine, and articulate the realm of discourses< it is not defined by the 
spontaneous attribution of a text to its creator, but through a series of precise and complex procedures; it 
does not refer, purely and simply, to an actual individual insofar as it simultaneously gives rise to a variety 
of egos and to a series of subjective positions that individuals of any class may come to occupy‛ (in Donald 
Bouchard (ed.), Language, Counter-Memory, Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 130-31).  Society 
Must Be Defended, as I hope to demonstrate here, offers us a paradigmatic example of how to handle such an 
author-function in the form of Foucault’s treatment of Hobbes. 
13 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, translated by David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 97-99. 
14 Ibid., 111. 
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Between hobbesian state theory and the insurrectionist assertion that politics is a racket 
(to twist Smedley Butler’s celebrated line), a battle had been waged.  Foucault’s insistence on 
this point suggests a fascinating slippage between the Leveller-Digger position and his own 
endeavour to resituate the Leviathan—and with it all those institutional disciplines that unsus-
pectingly accept sovereignty as an appropriate analyzer of power—on historico-political ter-
rain.  To put it plainly, Foucault is interested less in what Hobbes says than in what his dis-
course effectively does, how it works and how it manages resistance; less in the articulations it 
makes possible15 and more in those that it sublimates or simply closes off. 
The brilliant trickery performed by the hobbes-function, and the whole of modern 
philosophico-juridical discourse that would follow, lies in its rendering disciplinary power—
which was in its embryonic stage in 1651—effectively imperceptible.  For Foucault, the ‚great 
invention [of disciplinary power] was one of the basic tools for the establishment of industrial 
capitalism and the corresponding type of society,‛16 and it is precisely this ‚invention‛ that the 
theory of sovereignty elides.  Interestingly enough, Hobbes himself touts ‚industry‛ as one of 
the chief incentives for the establishment of a unitary sovereign.17  The result is an utter failure 
on the part of political theory to account for the role of non-governmental institutions in deter-
mining human behaviors and social relations.  It perhaps goes without saying that these very 
institutions (the prison, the asylum, the clinic, the school, the church, etc.) constitute the 
central target of Foucault’s research leading up to the lectures on war and governmentality.  In 
1976, he makes absolutely clear his differences with classical political philosophy.  Discipli-
nary technologies and techniques, he says, ‚cannot be described or justified in terms of the 
theory of sovereignty.  [They are] radically heterogeneous and should logically have led to the 
complete disappearance of the great juridical edifice of the theory of sovereignty.‛18  However 
sensible as this may seem, this is not the logic of the prevailing regime.  Where it should be 
understood as one institution among others, the sovereign office persists ‚as an ideology and 
<*an+ organizing principle,‛ taken for granted, still today, by the majority of scholarship pro-
duced in the name of political science, international relations, macroeconomics, and the like.  
In short, the hobbes-function 
 
made it possible to superimpose on the mechanism of discipline a system of right that 
concealed its mechanisms and erased the element of domination and the techniques of 
domination involved in discipline, and which, finally, guaranteed that everyone could 
exercise his or her own sovereign rights thanks to the sovereignty of the State.  In other 
words, juridical systems, no matter whether they were theories or codes, allowed the demo-
cratization of sovereignty and the establishment of a public right articulated with collective 
sovereignty, at the very time when, to the extent that, and because the democratization of 
sovereignty was heavily ballasted by the mechanisms of disciplinary coercion.19 
                                                 
15 This would have been the project of an earlier Foucault, the Foucault whose project was to excavate the 
epistemic delimitations of an epoch rather than the flows of power in the social field (see Deleuze, Nego-
tiations, 95).    
16 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 36. 
17 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 186. 
18 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 36. 
19 Ibid., 37. 
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This is to say that, behind the notions of humanity, human rights, democracy, freedom, etc.  
that define Western modernity, there remains a ubiquitous and constitutive violence.  Fou-
cault’s project is intended to displace such universalist concepts: an action on another action, 
as Foucault commonly described power, is far from ‚freedom‛ in any traditional sense.  By his 
formula, rather, power is never invested in a one—a sovereign, for example—but arises diffe-
rentially, between two, or between a heterogeneous multiplicity.   
Hobbes’ so-called history of the state form mythologizes and mystifies the material 
minutiae of the ‚new economy of power‛20—not sovereign, but disciplinary and productive—
that was emerging coterminously with his own soon-to-be canonical discourse.  Taking ‚pre-
cisely the opposite‛ tack as Hobbes, Foucault argues that, rather than assess power ‚from on 
high< we should be trying<to study the multiple peripheral bodies, the bodies that are 
constituted as subjects by [the] power-effects‛ of a newfangled admixture of disciplinary 
technologies and the obstinate ancien regime.21  Governmentality, as Foucault develops it, aims 
to ‚think power outside the categories of sovereignty‛22 and so too to shift the epistemic 
grounds for what can be considered political thinking.  Indeed, as Julian Bourg has it, ‚the 
throne pacifies,‛23 and doubly so: not only does the person of the sovereign, the decider of life 
and death, induce an immediate, ‚overawing< common power to feare,‛24 but, further still, 
the conceptual trope of the sovereign  renders any ‚outside‛ analyses—analyses that refuse it 
the indisputable legitimacy it demands—as inherently apolitical.  And, just to be clear, by in-
voking ‚the throne‛ we do not mean to limit our discussion to monarchical regimes.  Part of 
the beauty of Foucault’s genealogical critique lies in the way he is able to yoke the entire 
democratic project of modernity (the ‚democratization of sovereignty,‛ as he has it) to the 
initial hobbesian coup.  In doing this, he generates a rather brilliant slippage between his own 
position qua Hobbes and that of the seventeenth century Saxon descendents bluntly sub-
jugated to the dominant discursive trends of early modern political philosophy.   
We will return to the specific petitions of the Levellers and Diggers later in this essay.  
At this point, it seems more important to consider their forgotten discourses and their van-
quished knowledges as they exist in relation to Foucault’s thought in 1976.  This will entail an 
account of the metaphysical underpinnings and implications of his genealogical method, spe-
cifically with regard to its historico-political synthesis of time.  We have already seen how 
Foucault shares with his seventeenth-century counterparts a certain grid of intelligibility that 
attests to the brute conquest essential to the inauguration and maintenance of modernity’s 
social field.25  But more than a mere romanticization of history’s defeated, Foucault’s deploy-
                                                 
20 Ibid., 35. 
21 Ibid., 27-29.   
22 Julian Bourg, ‚Society Must Be Defended and the Last Foucault,‛ Radical Philosophy Review vol. 7, no. 1 
(2004), 2. 
23 Ibid., 2. 
24 Hobbes, 187. 
25 Julian Reid offers a thorough reading of the maintenance aspect, arguing that war is a necessary condition 
for the upkeep of contemporary sovereign power, as exemplified by the United States’ war in Iraq under 
Bush II (2009, 128).   
Foucault Studies, No. 11, pp. 156-178. 
162 
 
ment of the Leveller-Digger discourse performs—in true ‚untimely‛26 fashion—a function on 
the present.  Genealogy, as practiced by Foucault, aims to throw the contemporary moment 
and its calcifying relations of power abruptly out of joint, as it were, by presenting anew 
anachronistic demands and marrying historical knowledge to a political comportment three 
centuries removed.   
Moving beyond the archaeologist’s reconstruction of the conditions for knowledge, 
appearance, and articulation of a particular historical formation, the genealogist ‚restages‛ the 
‚hazardous play of dominations‛ through which a regime of power stabilizes itself.27  Fou-
cault carefully links his newfound method to Nietzsche’s concept of Entstehung, which 
‚designates emergence, the moment of arising< always produced through a particular stage of 
forces.‛28  This is contrasted with the concept of Ursprung, or origin, which belongs most pro-
perly to the pursuit of the historian, whose ‚search assumes the existence of immobile forms 
that precede the external world of accident and succession.‛29  Where Hobbes seems a perfect 
fit for the role of anti-genealogist, the insurrectionist discourses of the mid-seventeenth cen-
tury bear witness to precisely the sort of emergent moment that Nietzsche had theorized, and 
Foucault’s return to them seeks not to reverse what followed in the wake of their subjugation 
but rather to illuminate the mechanics of such epochal emergence.  Just before the discursive 
operation of the Leviathan would take hold was it possible, for but an instant, to see and to 
articulate the violence of governmentality as an accomplice to disciplinary power.  Foucault’s 
lectures on Hobbes attempt to make clear that philosophico-juridical discourse, as that which 
deflects mentalities elsewhere, was the lynchpin of the disciplinary paradigm in its nascent 
stage.  The date 1651 (the first publication of Leviathan) thus marks the moment when it was no 
longer possible to deter the arrangements of the classical age and the advance of pre-industrial 
capitalism.  To see and to say ‚disciplinary power‛ would not again be feasible until after that 
regime’s hegemony had passed into what Deleuze names ‚societies of control.‛30  
Foucault’s 1976 analysis of the emergence of sovereignty discourse and its triumphal 
concealment of disciplinary force coincides with another historical emergence that would per-
haps prove equal to its predecessors.  Significantly for Deleuze, the control paradigm announ-
ces a new phase of capitalism.  Foucault, in 1978-79, would investigate this emergent regime 
under the rubric of neoliberal governmentality, but we might equally characterize its constitu-
tion according to the market globalization inaugurated at Bretton Woods;31 vast innovations in 
                                                 
26 Deleuze, following Nietzsche, defines the ‚untimely‛ as an act both counter to and on its own time (1994, 
xxi), a recovery of a long forgotten past, regained in such a way that it appears as it had never been before by 
virtue of one’s actively willing it to return. 
27 Foucault, ‚Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,‛ 148. 
28 Ibid., 148.   
29 Ibid., 142. 
30 Gilles Deleuze, ‚Postscript on the Societies of Control,‛ October, vol. 59 (1992), 3-7.  Deleuze dates the 
hegemony of this new paradigm to coincide with the end of the Second World War.  He suggests that his 
epigrammatic sketch of control is an attempt to build on Foucault’s genealogy of neoliberal economic 
thought in The Birth of Biopolitics, despite Foucault’s own turning away from the present immediately follo-
wing these lectures.   
31 Where the International Monetary Fund and the first incarnation of the World Bank where established in 
1944. 
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production, telecommunications, and transportation technologies,32 the mathematicization and 
subsequent popularization of sophisticated financial instruments;33 securitization; debt-finan-
cing< and this list could go on, but my point here is not to enumerate the parameters of the 
New Economy in the societies of control, but, more generally, to explicate Foucault’s notion of 
emergence and suggest a disjunctive link, along these lines, between 1651 and 1976.  In plain 
terms, the free market discourse of neoliberalism obscures the tremendous violence that 
attends contemporary capital’s financial turn.34  The case of the Levellers and Diggers offer 
Foucault a way to think about how paradigm shifts in power actually occur while simul-
taneously displacing the one taking place at present.   
In ‚liberating a profusion of lost events,‛ genealogy, says Foucault, finds ‚disparity‛ 
and ‚dissension... at the historical beginning of things‛ and, equally important, promotes an 
unreserved ‚dissociation of the self.‛35 As opposed to history, genealogy posits an infinitely 
mutable past for the sake of establishing the infinite mutability of the present.  The very onto-
logical status of the re-searching subject is called into question at least as much as that of the 
objects of his or her search.  Indeed, Foucault’s various archival projects must be seen as at-
tempts to estrange the contemporary moment from itself, to make history for the present by 
delineating, in hitherto unforeseen ways, our difference from what we were.  In this sense, the 
Levellers and Diggers should be seen less as kindred spirits and more as alternative marks for 
self-dissension. 
  
2. Virtuality 
This is all to say that genealogy is a creative enterprise, an ethico-aesthetic practice that pre-
figures Foucault’s more explicit turn toward such things in the latter two volumes of History of 
Sexuality.36  There is a certain sympathy in Foucault’s archival choices, in his singular efforts to 
become outside of himself, so to speak.  His strategy, though admittedly not Deleuzian in any 
overt sense, owes much, I believe, to his compatriot’s metaphysical insights into lived 
temporality and collective individuation, his groundbreaking philosophy of difference and 
refusal of identity at all turns, and so too his collapse of subject and object into a ‚plane of 
immanence‛ more in line with post-Newtonian conceptions of the universe.  Thus far we have 
but scratched the surface of the Foucault-Deleuze relationship, and what we have done has 
been primarily through revisiting the latter’s ‚portrait‛ of his long-time friend.  We should 
now look more closely at Deleuze’s own philosophy, though in the name of concision we will 
                                                 
32 I refer to containerization, which revolutionized commercial shipping in the late 1960s, and to the marriage 
of automation and just-in-time production known commonly as Toyotism. 
33 Most notably, the Nobel-winning Black-Scholes model, articulated in 1973, successfully employed diffe-
rential calculus to the end of options pricing. 
34 See Christian Marazzi, The Violence of Financial Capital, translated by Kristina Lebedeva (New York: Semio-
text(e), 2010).   
35 Foucault, ‚Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,‛ 142, 145. 
36 Along these lines, John Rajchman reads Foucault, through Deleuze, as projecting ‚a picture of new ways of 
thinking about art, with art, of doing research, having ideas in art or through art institutions‛ (Rajchman, ‚A 
Portrain of Deleuze-Foucault for Contemporary Art,‛ in Simon O’Sullivan and Stephen Zepke (ed.), Deleuze, 
Guattari and the Production of the New (New York: Continuum, 2008), 80).  
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do so specifically through the lens of Foucault’s ‚Theatrum Philosophicum,‛ an essay review 
of Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense originally published in 1970.  By Foucault’s 
own account, we should understand the one’s flagship concept of virtuality as contrapuntal37 
and wholly indispensable to the other’s coterminous genealogical turn.   
Despite having been available in translation for over thirty years, ‚Theatrum 
Philosophicum‛ remains unduly marginal in most Anglo-American discussions of Foucault’s 
work.  To begin remedying this, I propose that we read this essay, alongside ‚Nietzsche, Ge-
nealogy, History‛38 as a prelude to or perhaps a harbinger of the archival research on prisons, 
sexuality, and governmentality that would come in its wake.  It is Deleuze, I believe, who cata-
lyzes the migration in Foucault’s thought from knowledge to power, from the dominant 
epistemic conditions of sayability to the larval stages and forceful maneuverings of particular 
discursive tropes like territory or population, sovereignty or war.  In Deleuze, Foucault dis-
covers the core concepts of a revolutionary new cosmology: difference and repetition, simula-
crum, event, and, of course, virtuality.  But to merely affirm Foucault’s deep admiration would 
be to tragically understate the degree to which he employs this Deleuzian framework in his 
genealogical practice to come.   
Setting out to overturn the entire legacy of Platonism, Deleuze supplants the quest for 
essences and eternal forms with an affirmation of novelty and change.  His is ‚a philosophy of 
the phantasm< that arises between surfaces, where it assumes meaning.‛39  Behind the ‚sur-
face effects‛ that appear to us as the actual phenomena in the world lurk an ‚expanding 
domain of intangible objects that must be integrated into our thought.‛40  Discourses, state-
ments, knowledges, memories, cultural histories, names of things, social problematizations, 
and so on are no less real than the palpable entities conditioned by them.  This is why, in order 
to understand power, we must abandon any ontology that takes subject-object distinctions as 
its starting point.  ‚Between surfaces‛—that is, between the actual people and things in a gi-
ven social milieu—this is where Foucault locates his new concept of power.  Differential rela-
tions and not preconceived identities pilot this ‚phantasmaphysics‛ that upends Western 
philosophy by revealing, at the heart of reality, ‚the materiality of incorporeal things.‛41 
In order to arrive at a concept of ‚difference-in-itself,‛ untethered from identitarian 
antecedents or static representation, Deleuze replaces the conventional picture of the universe 
organized along the lines of the possible and the real with his own, Bergson-inspired virtual-
actual ontological schema.  While it may at first glance seem but a nominal amendment, the 
change proposed here is actually quite vast.  First, in Deleuze’s account, everything is real;42 it 
                                                 
37 Which is metaphorically to say melodiously intertwined rather than harmonious.  Deleuze and Foucault 
are the name of two singular lines that occasionally resonate in some remarkable ways.   
38 Discussed above. 
39 Michel Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,‛ in Donald Bouchard (ed.), Language, Counter-Memory, Prac-
tice (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977), 169. 
40 Ibid., 169. 
41 Ibid., 170. 
42 Deleuze famously borrows Proust’s formula for the virtual as ‚real without being present, ideal without 
being abstract‛ (Deleuze, Proust and Signs, translated by Richard Howard (Mineapolis: Minnesota University 
Press, 2000), 58). 
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is just that reality is comprised of two halves: a domain of extensive qualities and individuated 
beings (the actual), and an intensive domain that conditions individuation processes but in no 
way resembles what those processes ultimately produce.  Second, as it does not resemble the 
actual and cannot be represented, the virtual is literally impossible, which is to say it delimits 
the possible and puts it into a relation of immanence with the real.  Third, Deleuze’s program 
affords a much richer sense of the passage of time; the virtual parlays the pure past—which 
Deleuze calls the ‚ground‛ of becoming—into an indeterminate, ‚groundless‛ future capable 
of turning the phenomenal present on its head.  This third point on the temporal qualities of 
the ontologically virtual warrants further explanation here, especially since, as I hope to 
convey, it is the temporality of Deleuze’s ‚phantasmaphysics‛ that really sets Foucault’s gene-
alogical project in motion, allowing him to clearly articulate the distinction between the 
historico-political and the philosophico-juridical outlined above. 
One of the central problems of Difference and Repetition involves demonstrating, without 
resorting to the outmoded categories of identity and sameness, how ‚a life‛ inheres, how it 
maintains formal consistency—or, as Foucault rather poetically puts it, how the subject-cum-
phantasm ‚conduct*s+ *its+ dance, act*s+ out *its+ mime, as extra-being.‛43  What is perhaps 
most striking about Foucault’s formulation is that he employs as metaphors the most cor-
poreal of art practices to describe the workings of incorporeal things; but the dancing or the 
miming body, we must remember, is one that has loosened itself from its determining coor-
dinates and articulations in order to become constituted by a passage of time or a zone of un-
speakability.   
For the extra-being, the phantasm, or ‚a life,‛ ‚time is subjective, but in relation to the 
subjectivity of a passive subject.‛44  As I am framing it here, Deleuze’s theory of the virtual 
hinges on his distinction between active and passive subjects—or, more specifically, between 
active and passive ‚syntheses of time,‛ or active and passive repetitions.  At the active level, 
the subject coheres in a passing present, in actual time, wherein it makes decisions, generates 
ideas, recalls memories, and does things.  The passive level, by contrast, is characterized by a 
virtual time whose subject, as it were, registers the past within each present as well as the 
‚pure‛ or ‚a priori‛ past, the ‚past in general,‛ which prepares the ground for the subject’s 
active valence.  Where the actual is an ever-shifting terrain, always undergoing metamor-
phoses and partaking in becomings of various kinds, the virtual, as ‚pure past‛ ‚insists, it 
consists, it is.‛45  ‚What we live empirically as a succession of different presents from the point 
of view of active synthesis is also the ever-increasing coexistence of levels of the past within passive 
synthesis.‛46  It is in this sense that we begin to grasp the function of repetition.  Following 
Bergson, Deleuze articulates each present as a particular, largely accidental ‚contraction‛ of 
the whole of the past, and each life, each phantasm, at any given moment, as that whole past 
actualized at a specific level of contraction or relaxation.  Identities and actions fall away, but 
                                                 
43 Foucault, ‚Theatrum Philosophicum,‛ 170. 
44 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, translated by Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994), 71. 
45 Ibid., 82.   
46 Ibid., 83.   
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what is differential in them—movements, intensities, affects, relations of force—eternally re-
turn.   
This brings us back to Foucault’s genealogical method.  The aim for Deleuze is to ‚in-
troduce< time into thought‛47 rather than to think about time.  If there is any ethical propo-
sition concealed within this early work, it would be to rediscover the passive syntheses of 
time—which is to say the various repetitions—that constitute our present, to mine the virtual 
for the means to future counter-memories, or counter-actualizations.  In his archival research, 
Foucault does just this; genealogy affects the present by culling up a new vision of the past.  
His aim is not that of a historian; he is not, for example in 1976, after the essence of the 
Leveler-Digger identity, nor is he out to reconstruct the rebellious activities these groups 
undertook.  Rather, he is interested in the way their discourse captures a singular set of intui-
tions of, encounters with, and investments by power.   
 
3. War 
In addition to the two essays discussed above, on Nietzsche and Deleuze respectively, the 
Society Must Be Defended lectures contain Foucault’s most pointed insight into the stakes of his 
genealogical project.  Genealogy, he says, ‚is a way of playing local, discontinuous, disquali-
fied, or nonlegitimized knowledges off against the unitary theoretical instance that claims to 
be able to filter them, organize them into a hierarchy, organize them in the name of a true 
body of knowledge.‛48  It is ‚an insurrection of knowledges< against the centralizing power-
effects that are bound up with the institutionalization and workings‛ of a hegemonic dis-
course such as the philosophico-juridical theory of sovereignty.  And once again, ‚genealogy 
is< an attempt to desubjugate historical knowledges, to set them free.‛49  In the case of the Le-
vellers and Diggers, what is important is not that they represented an oppressed, disen-
franchised mass seeking political recognition, but that they pinpointed the historical conquest 
from which the oppressive ruling regime had emerged.  Citing the Battle of Hastings in 1066 
as the critical determinant of social relations some 600 years later, the Levellers and Diggers, 
like Nietzsche and like Foucault, ‚find something altogether different behind things.‛50  They 
themselves deploy proto-genealogical tactics in their challenges to sovereign legitimacy.  The 
Battle of Hastings was, they claim, but one moment in an ongoing, if largely inconspicuous 
war.  It is this claim that Foucault, in 1976, repeats—albeit with a difference—and this war 
whose material effects he seeks, with certain analogical designs on the present, to make re-
appear.   
Against the ‚unitary‛ theory of power by which the Hobbes’ philosophico-juridical dis-
course ‚disqualifies,‛ ‚organizes,‛ or otherwise ‚subjugates‛ the counter-discursive tropes of 
the Levellers and Diggers, Foucault prefers to keep things messy, grasping power not from the 
perspective of a ‚central soul‛ but ‚at the point where it becomes capillary.‛51  Genealogy is 
interested specifically in how concepts become ‚invested, colonized, used, inflected, trans-
                                                 
47 Ibid., 88.   
48 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 9. 
49 Ibid., 9-10.   
50 Foucault, ‚Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,‛ 142.   
51 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 27, 29. 
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formed, displaced, extended, and so on by increasingly general mechanisms and forms of 
overall domination.‛52  The hobbes-function is such a ‚mechanism‛; the concomitant ‚form of 
domination‛ is the modern liberal state.  The concept at stake is that of war, which for the Le-
vellers and Diggers provided a way of explaining social relations and group dynamics before 
it metamorphosed into that thing that happens between two states when diplomacy fails.   
Foucault’s sketch of power relations circa 1651 hinges on his construction, via ‚a small 
lateral leap,‛53 of a dethroned, para-Leviathan.  His is a reading between the lines of sorts, but 
not in the Derridean deconstructionist sense; he aims not to tease out contradictions within 
Hobbes’ philosophico-juridical discourse but to discern retrospectively its historical material 
effects.  And this displacement of Hobbes also marks a ‚decentering‛ of Foucault himself, 
which helps explain why it frequently seems so difficult to locate authorial intent within any 
of his writings.  Deleuze perhaps puts it best in his rhetorical interrogation of Foucault’s style: 
‚What remains,‛ when all is said and done, ‚except an anonymous life that shows up only 
when it clashes with power, argues with it, exchanges ‘brief and strident words,’ and then 
fades back into the night?‛54  The Foucault-function, as it were, reveals itself only in the critical 
gap between text and para-text, between what is on the page and the accidents and successive 
dominations that it incites, between Hobbes and what happens to Hobbes once his efforts get 
recast within the iconoclastic genealogist’s inverted rubric of war.  Let us turn now to Hobbes’ 
text, its recoding of war, and Focuault’s treatment of it.   
We no doubt recall Hobbes’s story of the transition from the state of nature to political 
society, and, though this is not the place to explicate his creation myth of sovereign power, we 
would do well to recount a few basic elements that will be central to Foucault’s reading and 
eventual reconstruction of a counter-narrative.  The state of nature, claims Hobbes, is a state of 
war.  Prior to the unification of power in the figure of the sovereign, ‚the life of man‛ is 
dominated by a ‚continuall feare‛ of his fellow man; one’s capacity to kill and be killed is 
equal to that of every other, and so the quality of human life remains notoriously ‚solitary, 
poore, nasty, brutish, and short.‛55  In ‚this warre of every man against every man,‛ ‚there is 
no Injustice,‛ ‚no Law,‛ and, significantly, ‚no power able to over-awe them all.‛56  Enter the 
Leviathan—the vessel into which every individual, collectively, transfers her self-sovereignty, 
her fear, and her capacity to make war.  ‚The only way to erect< a Common Power, to keep 
them in awe, and to direct their actions to the Common Benefit‛ is through an ‚Artificiall 
Covenant,‛ by which a people  
 
conferre all their power and strength upon one Man< that may reduce all their Wills< into 
one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man< to beare their Person; and every 
one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their 
Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concerne the Common Peace 
and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and Judgements, to his 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 30. 
53 Foucault, ‚Theatrum Philosophicum,‛ 168. 
54 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, translated by Seán Hand (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1988), 95. 
55 Hobbes, 186.   
56 Ibid., 185, 188.   
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Judgement< This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-
WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS.57  
 
The advent of Leviathan thus marks the birth of justice and injustice, the possibility of law, 
and a crucial exchange that hinges on a fundamental will to life.  For protection from both ‚the 
invasion of Forraigners‛ and ‚the injuries of one another,‛58 the hitherto irreducible multitude 
commits not only to unconditional obedience, not only to the pre-emptive authorization of 
whatever the sovereign decides, but to prospective authorship of that decision.  This means that, 
in trading the perpetual risk of death for a guarantee of life,59 the individual precludes the 
sovereign’s very agency in making the decision by virtue of her already having made it for 
him.  It seems that, for Hobbes, the transference of sovereignty in the passage from multitude 
to civitas is something of a mystical, mythical event that gets retroactively valorized each time 
a declaration of revolt does not take place.60  
Perhaps most important, for our present project, is that the state of nature—the war of 
all against all—never existed in any actual, historical sense.  Nor does it need to, as its function 
in the hobbesian schema is rather to serve as a threat: War is what could happen if the multi-
tude reconstitutes itself by refusing authorship of the sovereign decision.  ‚For Hobbes, it does 
not all begin with war,‛ but with a state of war as the ‚permanent backdrop which cannot not 
function.‛61 Thoroughly absorbed into philosophico-juridical discourse, war is no longer sta-
ged but merely serves as ‚backdrop‛ for the staging of a more seemly, innocuous sort of 
politics.  As with Clausewitz, Hobbes pushes war to the horizons of the state.  War happens 
only when ‚normal‛ politics fails.  In other words, it is possible, but neither virtual nor real.   
In setting out to counter-actualize Hobbes’ ‚elimination of the historical reality of war,‛62 
Foucault intends neither to remind us that civil war is a perpetual possibility nor to demon-
strate that politics in any way resembles war; the former overstates the actual without taking 
stock of virtuality, while the latter mistakenly assumes a likeness between the actual and a vir-
tual that by definition cannot be recognized.  War, for Foucault, is a historical reality, a story of 
the past, the knowledge of which emerged briefly in the mid-seventeenth century only to be 
comprehensively suppressed and recoded by the political institutions established in the wake 
of the hobbes-function.  While Hobbes’ elaborate justification for sovereign power certainly 
lends itself to the cause of ending the ongoing English Civil Wars, his theoretical evacuation of 
war from properly political societies goes well beyond the actual state of affairs to strip war of 
its reality as virtual past.   
                                                 
57 Ibid., 226-7. 
58 Ibid., 227. 
59 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 96. 
60 It is along these lines that Montag suggests we read Hobbes as a precursor of sorts to Althusser, as perhaps 
the first theorist of the type of Ideological State Apparatus characteristic of capitalist society [Warren Mon-
tag, ‚Beyond Force and Consent,‛ in Antonio Callari and David F.  Ruccio (eds.), Postmodern Materialism and 
the Future of Marxist Theory (Hanover: Wesleyan UP, 1996), 91-108.]  Because the sheer force of the sovereign 
is not enough to maintain civil peace, the state must interpellate individuals to a ‚silent and unknowing but 
somehow not involuntary act‛ of consent. (Ibid., 98) 
61 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 93.   
62 Ibid., 97 (my emphasis).   
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To say that war is the grid of intelligibility by which we can grasp the workings of 
power in civil society means that we are un-forgetting the constituting conquests swept aside 
by the surrogate memories of sovereignty installed by the hobbes-function, that we are elec-
ting to jump tracks and proceed along an untested course of self-differentiation.  The philoso-
phico-juridical discourse substitutes a mythical past (the narrative that spans from primordial 
chaos and violence to the invocation of the Leviathan and the foundation of the state) for the 
historically real past and continued virtual presence of social war in England that dates as far 
back as the initial Norman conquest in 1066.   
We might say that, for Foucault, it is a matter of reinscribing that virtual into the actual, 
or of actualizing that virtual—repeating a dangerously subversive knowledge—in a better and 
more politically productive way.  War, in these terms, is fought over the power to decide pro-
blems and create solutions.63  Power is nothing if not the power to proceed from virtual to ac-
tual (and vice versa)—the power to conduct social individuation or constitute a grid of intelli-
gibility—in this or that way, armed with this history or another.   
With Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz’s aphorism, we can grasp politics as the actua-
lization of a virtual problematic of war.  Such a concept of politics is precisely what the philo-
sophico-juridical discourse of sovereignty conceals; but it is here that we must be particularly 
cautious.  The sort of war we are talking about has little to do with outright conflict, and we 
are by no means advocating dialectical violence as the proper response.  For Deleuze, ‚there is 
a false profundity in conflict‛64 that conceals a more profound thought of difference.65  Like-
wise for Foucault, who follows Deleuze’s take on the superficiality of conflict: ‚Dialectics does 
not liberate differences‛ but guarantees their perpetual recapture, and ‚contradiction secretly 
assists in the salvation of identities.‛  ‚The freeing of difference,‛ in turn, ‚requires affirmative 
thought without contradiction.‛66  ‚We must think problematically rather than question and 
answer dialectically.‛67 This means posing new problems rather than working out solutions to 
the old ones, which ultimately only mask the dynamics of social power.   
Where the modern concept of war that derives from Hobbes posits difference only on 
the basis of preconceived individual and group identities, the concept of war that Foucault 
discovers in 1976 appears to be inspired quite profoundly by Deleuze’s novel thought of 
difference.  The externalization of difference achieved by the notion of a foreign enemy—theo-
ries of which run from Hobbes to Schmitt all the way to contemporary international relations 
discourse—serves mainly to safeguard against internal schism.  Thus, despite serving as the 
enabling condition for political life, war’s usefulness as a paradigm for power relations has 
been lost on most of the modern world, and this thanks in part to a hobbes-function that elimi-
nates war’s historical reality.  As Foucault further elaborates, ‚There are no battles in Hobbes’ 
primitive war‛—‚there is no blood and there are no corpses‛; rather, ‚We are in a theater 
where presentations are exchanged, in a relationship of fear in which there are no time li-
mits< We are not at war; we are in< a state of war< not a battle or a direct clash of forces, 
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but a certain state of the interplay of representations.‛68  From his detached and seemingly 
impartial perspective, the Leviathan invents a transhistorical concept of war to justify sovereign 
power and maintain a unified state.  Hobbes places war on the real-possible axis rather than, 
as in the Deleuzian-Foucauldian intervention, that of the actual-virtual.  As a grid of intelligi-
bility and the condition for the actualization of political life, ‚war,‛ for Foucault, is not neces-
sarily strewn with corpses, but, as a virtual problematization, it is, again, absolutely real.  And 
this is certainly more than we can say for Hobbes, who embarks on the imaginative recon-
struction of an idea of war in the service of the state and, in so doing, slyly absconds from the 
actual war milieu of mid-seventeenth century England.69 
In its timeless, ahistorical exchange of representations, the hobbesian state of war, de-
spite its ever-present possibility, betrays its fundamental impotentiality.  War in Hobbes is in fact 
completely and cunningly cleft from the realities of modern power’s burgeoning disciplinary 
techniques and technologies.  In short, this particular discursive representation of war pre-
cludes the very thought of war’s actualization as politics.  Indeed, Hobbes affirms as much.  
Toward the end of Leviathan Part I, he avers that ‚the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall 
fighting; but in the known disposition thereto.‛70  It is thus not the battle that interests Hobbes, 
in his retroactive foundation of sovereignty, but the communication of a threat and the con-
tinual fear of that threat’s being followed through.  It is specifically this universal and univer-
sally debilitating knowledge that precipitates the consolidation of sovereignty.  The apprehen-
sion of one’s neighbours as predisposed for a fight in fact makes for a smooth transition from 
nature to civitas, where salvation from the ‚nasty, brutish, and short‛ life obliged by the state 
of war comes in the form of an ‚over-awing< common Power to feare‛—i.e. the Leviathan.71  
Foucault notes that, in Hobbes, ‚it is fear, the renunciation of fear that introduces us 
into the order of sovereignty and into a juridical regime< of absolute power,‛72 but we see 
here that it is not quite this simple; total ‚renunciation‛ never occurs, as Hobbes emphatically 
reinscribes this fear on the other side of the sovereign exchange.73  But it is not war itself that 
                                                 
68 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 92-93 (my emphases).   
69 The theater metaphor deployed by Foucault here provides an interesting counterbalance to his own 
genealogical ‚restaging‛ of a historico-politically specific instance of subjugation.  We are left with two dis-
tinct models of theatricization: the one recodes the concept of war by removing it from reality and stripping 
it of its analytical efficacy; the other decodes that same concept in order to delegitimate the diversionary 
tactics of its state executors. 
70 Hobbes, 186 (my emphasis). 
71 Ibid., 187. 
72 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 95.   
73 And the phrase of Hobbes’ ‚common Power to feare‛ is rather slippery in its own right.  On the one hand, 
we typically read Leviathan as the ‚common power to be feared.‛ Around his ‚awesome‛ strength, the dis-
parate fears of all become consolidated, and civil society maintains its peace through this unitary redirection 
of fear.  On the other hand, the ‚common Power to fear‛ signifies that the sovereign himself shoulders the 
whole set of incongruent fears and, in so doing, relieves his charges of their burdens.  By this interpretation, 
the sovereign is he who fears on behalf of the common, he who surveils the borders in making good on his 
security guarantee, ‚over-awing‛ in the same way that Christ’s Passion ‚over-awes‛ the believer in its tra-
ding one life for the deliverance of a nation.  Either way we parse the syntax—as fearing-in-common or as a 
communal displacement of fear—we are left with roughly the same perplexing outcome.  Yet there remains 
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continues in civil society; all that persists—in fact all that was ever there—is its correlative 
‚dispositional‛ frame.  The state of nature abides by an atemporality that allots no change and 
contains no events.  The time of war, for Hobbes, is wholly without an ‚account of Time.‛74  In 
this time without account, nothing comes to pass, nothing happens, nothing awaits; the fearful 
disposition that consumes one’s being in war-time simply lingers, as Hobbes has it, like ‚foule 
Weather.‛75   
Mindful of the threat posed to royal power by the war-conscious counter-discourses 
and conquest-laden minoritarian histories of the Levellers and the Diggers, Hobbes, in his 
genius, rewrites the narrative of political legitimacy.  In Leviathan Part II, he presents two basic 
means for achieving sovereignty, and two corresponding types of common-wealth.  The first, 
‚Commonwealth by Acquisition,‛ arises through ‚Naturall force< or by Warre,‛ wherein 
subjects abandon their will by willing to live rather than fight to the death; the second, 
‚Commonwealth by Institution,‛ forms ‚when men agree amongst themselves, to submit< 
voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by *the sovereign+ against all others.‛76 Though 
Hobbes unmistakably identifies ‚force‛ and ‚warre‛ as driving the former, Foucault will 
argue that this entire scheme is a clever ruse to discursively deflect the spilt blood and piled 
corpses that accumulate in the name of securitizing the state.  Commonwealth by acquisition 
and commonwealth by institution amount to the same thing—a ‚radical will to live.‛77 
Taking up the pseudo-war seemingly prolonged in post-acquisition social relations, 
Foucault argues that  
 
once the defeated have shown a preference for life and obedience, they make their victors 
their representatives and restore a sovereign to replace the one who was killed in the war.  It 
is therefore not the defeat that leads to the brutal and illegal establishment of a society based 
upon domination, slavery, and servitude; it is what happens during the defeat, or even 
after< the defeat, and in a way, independently of it< The will to prefer life to death: that is 
                                                                                                                                                                  
another, more radical permutation of this syntactical ambiguity presented by Hobbes.  We might take ‚com-
mon Power‛ to signify a power belonging to the common.  This seems accurate given Hobbes’ persistent 
reminders that the power of the sovereign derives from and stands to re-present his subjects.  Acting in com-
mon can be an ‚over-awing‛ experience, to be sure, but this certainly does not seem like something Hobbes 
would be advocating.  Rather, the slippage created in such a ‚minor‛ reading, as it were, lets a disaggre-
gated multitude seep into the very discourse that had been constructed to keep it at bay (see Paolo Virno, 
Grammar of the Multitude, translated by Isabella Bertoletti (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004) for a thorough 
analysis of Hobbes’ displacement of ‚multitude‛ with ‚people‛).  Likewise, James Martel offers a more or 
less deconstructive reading of Leviathan, showing how Hobbes’ theory of reading undermines his model of 
sovereignty.  In the final analysis, Martel presents us with Hobbes not as the father of liberalism but as a ‚ra-
dical democrat‛ (see James Martel, Subverting the Leviathan: Reading Thomas Hobbes as a Radical Democrat 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
74 Hobbes, 186.   
75 Ibid., 186.  Hobbes notes here too that wartime is particularly deleterious because therein nothing can be 
produced. (Hobbes, 180)  We thus begin to see something of the relationship between the discourse of sove-
reignty and disciplinary societies in the proto-industrial age.   
76 Ibid., 228. 
77 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 96.   
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what founds sovereignty, and it is as juridical and legitimate as the sovereignty that was 
established through the mode of institution and mutual agreement.78 
 
Sovereignty, and not domination, thus grounds the relationship between conqueror and 
conquered, just as it does the relationship between a voluntary subject and her protector in the 
commonwealth by institution.  Entirely ‚independent‛ of the events of war, hobbesian sove-
reignty originates in a fundamental will to representation, not in the fact of victory but in ‚the 
recognition of the conqueror by the vanquished as their political representative.‛79  What counts 
here is not the conquest but its being recognized as such.  Sovereignty assumes a preexisting, 
mediatory idea of ‚victory‛ that can serve as a common reference point for conquerors and 
conquered alike.  Political society, in this analysis, continues the ‚play of representation‛ enac-
ted in the primordial state of war.  The inaugural conquest merely draws out a people’s pining 
for a more secure state and then expedites the results.   
In the hands of the state, ‚History,‛ says Foucault, ‚is the discourse of power‛ and ‚a 
ritual that reinforce*s+ sovereignty.‛80  The leveling force of such disciplined History invariably 
sweeps in to immobilize, capture, and eventually recode the war discourse of its ‚opposite 
numbers.‛ This is precisely the hobbes-function in mid-seventeenth century England.81  The 
entire project of sovereignty is in fact ‚a certain ‘no’ to war‛82 and therefore ‚a certain ‘no’‛ to 
historical contingencies.83  In the ‚radical will to live‛ that undergirds both acquisitional and 
institutional commonwealth—or rather in the idea of this ‚radical will‛ that the hobbes-
function covertly instills—Foucault catches the first glimpses of the administrative state and 
the new governmental mandate to ‚make live and let die‛ (as opposed to the old style, which 
operated inversely).  The superficial taxonomy is simply Hobbes’ way of ‚get*ting+ around the 
problem of the Conquest *of England+‛—‚that difficult juridical category< which was central 
to all the political discourses and programs of the seventeenth century.‛84  
By contrast, the discourse of political historicism, exemplified by the Levellers and Dig-
gers, posits war as ‚both the web and the secret of institutions and systems of power,‛ and 
this ‚is Hobbes’s great adversary.‛85 On the surface of things, Hobbes appears to be attemp-
ting to dissolve an actual intrastate war, parrying the motives for rebellion and reconciling 
defeated subjects with the crown.  But Foucault’s point is much more acute and entails a much 
more complex view of reality.  As both ‚web‛ and ‚secret,‛ war enables the perpetuation of 
normalized power relations.  It is the virtual condition for actual systems and institutions.  
Hobbes seeks, in Deleuzian terms, a different ‚contraction‛ of the past, and more discon-
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certing than his immediate suppression of the historically local antagonists to royal power 
should be his deft elimination of war at the virtual level.    
Along these lines, we cannot lose sight of the ‚by other means‛ qualification in the sto-
ried equation of politics and war.  Politics is not war; rather, the latter serves as a grid of intel-
ligibility by which we can think through and against a historically specific connection between 
power and knowledge.  War becomes an ‚other means‛ to arrive at the truth of the present 
through the past.  In the end, Foucault does not seem interested in political society per se so 
much as in the material effects of our belief in it and the narrative that our thought of ‚political 
society‛ either covers over or reveals.  To tie politics back to war rather than war to politics (as 
in the Clausewitzian formula), is to restore an ‚effective history‛ capable of toppling the sove-
reign model of power by liberating the past for a people to come—for a new trajectory by 
which to differentiate the present from itself. 
‚We have to study power outside the model of Leviathan, outside the field delineated 
by juridical sovereignty and the institution of the state.‛86  We must ‚force open the massive 
overdetermination of the problem of sovereignty.‛87 Ahistorical and anti-political, the philoso-
phico-juridical theory of sovereignty must be rejected once and for all as an obsolete relic of a 
time with which it never even coincided.  In escaping the hobbes-function, Foucault restages 
the ‚bellicose history‛ illumined by the phantasms of the seventeenth century.  We need that 
‚truth-weapon‛ named social war if we intend to work our way through power formations as 
dynamic, politically and historically contingent things.  Laws and rights must come to be read 
as strategies and tactics in accordance with the simple fact that the institutionalization of sove-
reignty is in every case, without exception, a partisan victory that refuses itself as such.88  It 
remains the genealogist’s task to reject contemporary appearances by diving into a forgotten 
past and retrieving the discursive and conceptual tools with which a counter-actuality can be 
forged.  In Society Must Be Defended, Foucault locates these tools in the ‚partisan discourses‛ of 
war that antedate the ‚ideal battles and rivalries dreamed up by *the+ philosophers and 
jurists‛ of the early modern era.89  The archive exposes the true political history of the law—
‚born in the blood and mud of battles,< in burning towns and ravaged fields,< together with 
the famous innocents who died at break of day.‛90 
As strategists of counter-actualization in their own right, the Levellers and Diggers 
were making ‚political use< of a certain historical knowledge pertaining to wars, invasions, 
pillage, dispossessions, confiscations, robbery, exaction, and the effects of< all the real strug-
gles that go on in the laws and institutions that apparently regulate power.‛91  It is in this sense 
that theirs is the ‚opposite number‛ to the discourse of order and eternal right.  Foucault sets 
out to vindicate the Leveller and Digger belief that laws and institutions do not regulate so 
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much as wield power.  These real struggles of the past not only precipitate laws and institu-
tions but are fully present in them; knowledge of them affords a certain power to effectuate 
actuality otherwise.  Where philosophico-juridical discourse proffers universal knowledge and 
transcendental subjects with self-evident and inalienable rights, its ‚strategic opposite num-
ber‛ emits a ‚subject who is fighting a war,‛ armed with ‚a truth-weapon and a singular 
right.‛92  The radical war discourses of seventeenth century England, against both the long-
standing tradition of royal history and the nascent philosophico-juridical discourse of sove-
reignty, expresses a sense of the virtual as real and a politicized take on the past, and this, I 
believe, is the essential attraction for Foucault. 
‚The truth is< a truth that can be deployed only from its combat position, from the 
perspective of the sought-for victory and ultimately< of the survival of the speaking subject 
himself.‛93  This point resounds in all of Foucault’s later work.  The truth is always a truth—
singular, indefinite, fragmentary.  The partisan discourse of the Levellers and Diggers appears 
‚strategically‛ to inscribe a difference within the field of social relations that necessarily calls 
into question the subjectivation process therein.  In recovering and re-recording painful cultu-
ral memories, in reconfiguring the collective past, it seeks to create a new people and to justify 
a wholesale redistribution of knowledge, sensibility, and wealth across the social field.  Its 
history is effectively a counter-history; the truths it wields, which are always plural and 
divisive, are ‚not made for understanding *but+ for cutting.‛94  It recalls the real wars by which 
sovereignty consolidates power and which sovereignty deigns to forget.95  
The discourse of war that culminated with the Levellers and Diggers reveals the peace-
ful maintenance of the state to have been predicated all along on a continued but hidden 
renewal of violence and exclusion.  As Todd May concisely argues, ‚the recounting of< the 
history of a nation had< always been a state affair,‛ which is to say a ‚triumphal and 
justificatory< story the state told to itself about its emergence.‛96  The key elements of this 
official discourse are a ‚unified we that is moving forward in a positive way‛ and ‚a history 
that justifies the present moment.‛97  State history, in short, expresses only the most uncritical 
relation to the past.  To do otherwise would be deemed a national security threat.98  The sort of 
history presented by the Levellers and Diggers, conversely, attempts to overturn the estab-
lished regime, but especially its concordant arrangement of knowledge and power, by an 
irrevocable incision between nation and state, Saxon and Norman, subject and crown.  Theirs 
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is what Foucault names a race discourse—an explicitly perspectival, politically motivated coun-
ter-narrative of the emergence of the governing faction.  We should be thinking of race not in 
terms of static, biological identity, but in terms of a particular, shared relationship with the 
past; in Foucault’s usage, race seems more epigenetic than genetic, having to do not with es-
sences but with processes of group organization and internal differentiation.  Running along-
side the English civil wars, we see, between Hobbes and his opposite numbers, a ‚clash be-
tween the history of sovereignty and the history of race war.‛99  One pushes violence to the 
frontiers of the state, renders war a matter of international relations, and so unites a people as 
one homogeneous mass.100  The other tears the state apart at the seams, introduces intrastate 
fault lines along the coordinates of nation and state, and aims not to pacify but to enrage; and 
it does all this by reaching into the virtual sphere to re-pose the ‚problematizations‛ deter-
minant of socio-political individuation.   
This discourse of race war is the revolutionary counterhistory that Hobbes’ book, by 
slyly suturing the nation back into the state, effectively eradicates.  It told of the invasions and 
injustices underlying the legitimation of Norman rule in the eleventh century.  This ‚history-
as-demand,‛ as Foucault has it, ‚intruded upon all the historical work that the monarchist 
jurists were undertaking in order to recount the uninterrupted history of the power of the 
kings of England.‛101  Against the philosophico-juridical discourse that sought to displace the 
thought of violent acquisition with theories of commonwealth and systems of contractual 
sovereignty, the Levellers and Diggers were vociferously asserting that ‚the Conquest did take 
place‛—that the defeat of the Saxons by the Normans marked ‚not the beginnings of< 
absolute right but a state of nonright that invalidates all the laws and social differences that 
distinguish the aristocracy, the proper regime, and so on‛—that ‚the laws are traps< 
instruments of power< ways of promoting vested interests.‛102  To repeat, the Conquest did 
take place, and its force is perpetually renewed insofar as its concept is forgotten, that is, 
insofar as it becomes masked by the social relations codified in legal apparatuses and political 
institutions that ward off the political usage of the past.103 
This singular assertion of right by which the insurrectionists declare their freedom 
‚from slavish fear of men‛104 gives the lie to the universality dreamt up by philosophico-
juridical discourse and its blind faith in a common share, its myth of equal access to political 
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representation, and its presupposition of recognizable victory and an end to war.  ‚The poor 
oppressed people of England‛ give expression to an ongoing battle, a social war 600 years in 
the making.  The community that they imagine is bifurcated not according to territorial alle-
giances but along the lines of guilt and innocence, oppressor and oppressed, which, again, is 
to say that they construe difference as internal to and constitutive of modern political society.  
Theirs is a phantom discourse in that it always ‚exceeds‛ the event that it names.  Their 
history of race war is nothing more than ‚the play of the (missing) event and its repetition,‛ to 
adopt the terms of Foucault’s earlier essay on Deleuze.105  The indefinite multiplication of the 
‚(missing)‛ conquest-event, which sovereignty had rather subtracted out, is the true task of 
the Leveller and Digger discourse, as well as that of Foucault, writing three centuries later, 
from the other side of the disciplinary age.   
What returns in Foucault—what he returns to us—is precisely this ‚(missing)‛; it is not 
the event of the Conquest per se, but the form of its ‚play‛ that haunts the present and stokes 
the fires of insurrection.  For Deleuze, to repeat what is ‚(missing)‛ in this way is to affirm that 
which is outside of all identity—‚difference-in-itself.‛ As pure difference, ‚the event *of con-
quest] is always an effect produced entirely by bodies colliding, mingling, or separating, but 
this effect is never of a corporeal nature; it is the intangible, inaccessible battle that turns and 
repeats itself a thousand times.‛106  Genealogy inscribes just this—a retroactive reopening of an 
incorporeal event, which sends the contemporary moment on a line of flight, exposing it to 
what Deleuze calls the ‚empty‛ or ‚pure form of time.‛107  Foucault’s method operates accor-
ding to the temporal structure of eternal return, wherein pure difference and profound 
repetition topologically coincide in an affirmation of what cannot be preserved—i.e. time 
itself, as it passes, immanent to life.  In 1651, a phantom of war had been haunting sovereignty, 
threatening to block the furtive instantiation of the disciplinary regime.  In 1976, the phantom 
would return—the same phantom, but different—‚equal,‛ as Deleuze says, ‚to the unequal in 
itself.‛108  The refrain of ‚effective history‛—‚to die, to fight, to vanquish, to be van-
quished‛109—forces the return of lost time.  Foucault calls this ‚counter-memory‛; it affects, he 
says, ‚a transformation of history into a totally different form of time.‛110  It thereby remains 
wholly outside the onto-epistemological structure of the state, and, as such, would be properly 
staved off by all those disciplines and institutions that took root once the discourse of sove-
reignty had been firmly set in place. 
The archival re-search Foucault undertakes in Society Must Be Defended resituates the 
specific enunciations of Hobbes’ obsolete analytical model within the circumstances of its con-
tested emergence and the site of its original victory.  The historical knowledges that he re-
plays, as it were, reject the diversionary stories of great men and their episodic wars in favor of 
‚continu*ing+ the war by deciphering the war and struggle that are going on within all the 
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institutions of right and peace.‛111  In short, historical knowledge is always political and 
always partisan, statist claims to the contrary notwithstanding.  Following his early-modern 
avatars in the ‚deployment‛ of such knowledge, Foucault has never been more clear in spel-
ling out the critical political project he hopes to open up.  Telescoping together a present that 
was and a past that refuses to go away, genealogical thought severs knowledge from power 
and violently (if virtually) interrupts the normative status of social relations and governmental 
regimes. 
In his postscript to Foucault, Deleuze reminds us that, as we transition out of the dis-
ciplinary paradigm and into one of ‚control,‛ ‚there is no need to fear or hope, but only to 
look for new weapons.‛112 Seeking a way to extricate his own thought from apparatuses of 
power, Foucault finds one such weapon in the ‚effective history‛ of race war that partially 
illuminated a tempestuous social field in the middle of the seventeenth century.  If, as Fou-
cault suggests, following Deleuze, ‚the present as the recurrence of difference< affirms at 
once the totality of chance,‛113 then it should, for us, be a matter of throwing off the probable 
course of social evolution and collective differentiation.  In the formative years of the post-
disciplinary paradigm, and as a rejoinder to the opening salvos of capital’s widespread finan-
cialization (the credit boom, securitization, standardized valuation of derivatives, de-indu-
strialization in the West, etc.), Foucault abandons himself to the archives, channeling those 
voices of the past that bear witness to an altogether different present, but one that we already 
no longer were.  And through this temporal play of his genealogical method, Foucault bears 
witness to an altogether different future—an altogether different future for us.   
Today, when we most often hear the word ‚sovereign‛ used in conjunction with 
‚bond‛ or ‚debt,‛ the discourse analysis of Society Must Be Defended should appear all the 
more (un)timely.  Wars rage just below the surface of a world where these instruments and 
their consequent repayment plans bankroll the continued activity of the state; increasingly 
prevalent ‚austerity measures,‛ commanded from a supranational and super-sovereign level, 
should be understood as so many weapons.  ‚Humanity,‛ Foucault reminds us, ‚does not pro-
gress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity,< *but+ installs each of its 
violences in a system of rules.‛114  The point of genealogy, as I have attempted to show in these 
pages, is to make those violences and their concealments appear anew, to undermine our pen-
chant for ‚universal reciprocity‛ at every turn.  Sovereignty does not vanish as the discipli-
nary regime takes hold, nor does it do so as we migrate ever more conclusively into societies 
of control.  Rather, its qualities transform; it undergoes a certain transduction.  It therefore 
seems quite clear how Foucault could start with Hobbes and Clausewitz and end up, just two 
courses later, at Hayek, Friedman, Becker, and the whole neoliberal milieu.  Though his late 
thought would turn away from modern and contemporary governmentalities, I hope that, by 
drawing on Deleuze, I have been able to make clear, first, the pivotal role of the Society Must 
Be Defended lectures (and their immediate successors) in the evolution of Foucault’s thought, 
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and, perhaps more importantly, the politics of genealogy more generally—the critical 
contemporaneity that flanks Foucault’s archival intimations.   
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